








Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
and Professor of Economics
Southern Methodist University
Lori L. Taylor
Senior Economist and Policy Advisor
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Analysis suggests that
homebuyers and economists
share the same definition
of school quality.
Most people are familiar with the adage
that real estate values are determined by three
basic characteristics—location, location, location.
Economists consider this cliché only a modest
exaggeration because research suggests that
locational characteristics can explain much of
the variation in residential property values. Not
surprisingly, home prices tend to be lower
in communities with high property taxes and
higher in communities with low crime rates.
Home prices fall as the commute to the central
business district increases and rise as the
amount of air pollution decreases. Locations
near a city park command a premium, while
locations near the city dump sell at a discount.
Popular wisdom and economic research
suggest that the quality of the neighborhood
school should also be an important locational
characteristic. Many researchers have found that
property values are higher where school spend-
ing is higher (for example, Oates 1969; Sonstelie
and Portney 1980; and Bradbury, Case, and Mayer
1995). Other researchers have found a positive
relationship between housing values and the test
performance of students at the corresponding
school (for example, Jud and Watts 1981, Rosen
and Fullerton 1977, and Walden 1990). How-
ever, the economic literature on school quality
measurement argues that the appropriate meas-
ure of school quality is the school’s marginal
effect on students (see Hanushek 1986), and no
one has examined the relationship between
marginal school effects and housing values.1
Thus, we have an incongruity in the literature:
spending and test scores seem to influence prop-
erty values, but economists who study schools
would not generally consider these characteris-
tics measures of school quality. Meanwhile, the
literature has been silent on whether the econo-
mists’ notion of school quality is a locational
characteristic that matters to homebuyers.
In this article, we attempt to identify the
influence of neighborhood schools on the value
of residential homes. Using a hedonic model of
home purchases and historical data on homes in
the Dallas Independent School District (DISD),
we demonstrate that school quality can be an
important locational characteristic in determin-
ing housing values. We find evidence that prop-
erty values in DISD reflect student test scores
but not school expenditures. Interestingly, we
also find that the relationship between test scores
and property values arises from an underlying
relationship between property values and the
marginal effects of schools. Thus, our analysis
suggests that homebuyers and economists share
the same definition of school quality.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       3       ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1996
A simple model of housing values
A house is a collection of desirable charac-
teristics such as shelter, comfort, and location.
Therefore, the price that buyers are willing to
pay for a house should be related to the prices
they are willing to pay for its component charac-
teristics. By treating a house as the sum of its
parts, a hedonic housing model generates esti-
mates of the consumer’s willingness to pay for
each component characteristic.
Our hedonic model of housing prices in a
single labor market is adapted from Rosen (1974).
In this simplified model, consumers attempt to
maximize their own happiness, taking the hous-
ing stock as given. Consumers derive satisfac-
tion from consuming all sorts of housing
characteristics (Z = z1, z2,....zn) and a composite
good (x). They earn an income (y) regardless of
their chosen residence and can only consume
combinations of Z and x that are affordable
given that income. There are many types of
consumers, and tastes for Z and x differ among
those consumers according to socioeconomic
characteristics (α) such as the person’s age or
educational attainment. In equilibrium, all con-
sumers with identical preferences and income
are able to achieve the same level of satisfaction.
After some manipulation, the individual
consumer’s decision-making can be described
with a willingness-to-pay relationship or, more
formally, a bid rent function:
(1) R = R(z1,z2....zn:y,α).
The value of the bid rent function represents the
amount the consumer is willing to pay to rent a
home with certain characteristics (Z), given the
consumer’s income level and socioeconomic type.
Partial derivatives of the bid rent function with
respect to housing characteristics represent the
consumer’s willingness to pay for those charac-
teristics.
The price a potential buyer would be will-
ing to pay for a house represents the present
discounted value of the after-tax stream of bid
rents.2 If τR is the tax rate chosen by the jurisdic-
tion for real estate,3 θ represents the discounting
factor, and housing is an infinitely lived asset,
then the bid price of a house (P) would be
or equivalently,
The variation in incomes and socioeconomic
characteristics generates a continuum of bid prices
over a variety of types of homes.
In equilibrium, the sale price of any par-
ticular house equals the highest bid offered by
potential consumers, regardless of their income
or socioeconomic type. The hedonic price func-
tion describes this equilibrium.4 The hedonic
price function that we estimate describes the
arm’s length sales price as a function of the
characteristics of the house and of its location.5
The locational characteristics include neighbor-
hood characteristics as well as local school char-
acteristics.
The data
Data for this analysis come from three
sources. Data on elementary school charac-
teristics have been provided by DISD. Data on
the characteristics of single-family homes in
DISD come from the SREA Market Data Center’s
annual publication of residential property
transactions. We restrict attention to the 288
DISD properties for which complete data are
available that sold in July 1987 and were located
in both the city and the county of Dallas.
Data on nonschool locational characteristics
come from the 1990 Census of Housing and
Population.
DISD has provided data on student body
characteristics, student achievement scores, and
per-pupil expenditures for ninety-six elementary
schools in its jurisdiction. From these data, we
construct four possible indicators of school quality
in 1987—current expenditures per pupil (SPEND),
average sixth-grade achievement in mathematics
on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (MATH687), the
marginal effect of the school on sixth-grade
mathematics achievement (SCHL687 ), and the
expected achievement of the student body in
sixth-grade mathematics (PEER687 ). The first
two of these indicators are common measures
of school quality in the housing literature. The
second two indicators represent a decomposi-
tion of average mathematics achievement into
school effects and peer group effects (see the
appendix). SCHL687 measures the increase in
student achievement in mathematics that can be
attributed to the school. It corresponds to a
common measure of school quality in the eco-
nomics of education literature (see Hanushek
and Taylor 1990, Aitkin and Longford 1986, and
Boardman and Murnane 1979). PEER687 is in-
cluded as a possible indicator of school quality
because research has shown that a high-achiev-
ing peer group in the school can have a positive
effect on individual student performance (Sum-
mers and Wolfe 1977).
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The housing data used in this analysis in-
clude the log of the sale price of the property
(PRICE), the year in which the home was built
(YRBUILT ), the number of square feet of living
area in the structure (SQFTLA), and indicator
variables that take on the value of one if the
house has a swimming pool or a fireplace and
zero otherwise (POOL and FIREPL, respectively).
To capture potential nonlinearities in the rela-
tionship between the sale price and the age of
the property, we also include interaction terms
that take on the value of YRBUILT when the
residence has a pool (YR•POOL) or fireplace
(YR•FIREPL) and zero otherwise. We match the
potential school quality indicators with housing
characteristics using the SREA data on addresses
and a Realtor’s guide to DISD attendance zones
(Positive Parents of Dallas et al. 1987).
The address data also permit us to merge
in census tract characteristics from the 1990
Census of Housing and Population. The census
tract data support three nonschool locational
characteristics. These potential locational char-
acteristics are the demographic characteristics
of the neighborhood residents (NEIGHBORS),6
the share of apartments in the neighborhood
housing stock (APARTMENTS), and a proxy for
the accessibility of private schools (the share of
the elementary school population that is attend-
ing private school, denoted PRIVSCHL).
Finally, we used the address data to con-
struct another nonschool locational characteris-
tic—the linear distance to the central business
district (DISTANCE)—and to divide the sample
into two parts according to whether or not the
property is located substantially north of down-
town Dallas.7
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for
the data used in this analysis. As the table clearly
indicates, there are significant differences be-
tween northern and southern Dallas.8 On aver-
age, northern Dallas homes are more expensive,
bigger, and more likely to have a pool or fire-
place. Northern Dallas schools register higher
on all our potential indicators of school quality.
The average northern Dallas neighborhood has
a smaller share of apartments in the housing
stock and more access to private elementary
schools than the average southern Dallas neigh-
borhood. Meanwhile, the residents of southern
Dallas neighborhoods are more likely than the
residents of northern Dallas to be black or His-
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics: A Tale of Two Cities
Northern Dallas Southern Dallas
Standard Standard
Variable Mean deviation Mean deviation
PRICE $203,266 (204,301) $82,502 (55,926)
SQFTLA 2,192 (1,026) 1,471 (568)
YRBUILT 58.3 (13.2) 53.5 (18.7)
POOL .22 (.42) .04 (.19)
FIREPL .71 (.45) .42 (.50)
DISTANCE 2.46 (.65) 2.11 (.86)
APARTMENTS .18 (.20) .26 (.23)
PRIVSCHL .39 (.21) .10 (.08)
NEIGHBORS –1.47 (1.34) 1.59 (1.62)
MEDIAN INCOME $52,819 (26,841) $27,256 (7,735)
COLLEGE .72 (.15) .40 (.20)
BLUE-COLLAR .11 (.09) .31 (.13)
UNDER 12 .12 (.03) .18 (.05)
OVER 65 .19 (.06) .11 (.04)
HISPANIC .10 (.12) .32 (.25)
BLACK .03 (.05) .27 (.29)
SPEND $2,498 (381) $2,068 (232)
MATH687 76.97 (5.27) 69.56 (4.26)
SCHL687 29.55 (4.30) 26.86 (3.18)
PEER687 47.42 (3.21) 42.70 (3.07)
Number of observations 150 138FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       5       ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1996
panic, young, hold a blue-collar job, have a
lower income, and to have not attended college.
The estimation and results
Because southern and northern Dallas dif-
fer so dramatically, we estimate the hedonic
price function separately for the two areas using
weighted least squares regression.9 Furthermore,
for comparison with the previous literature, we
examine three models of the hedonic price
function. In the first model, school quality is
measured by per-pupil spending. In the second
model, school quality is measured by both per-
pupil spending and test scores. In the third
model, which represents an unrestricted version
of the second model, test scores are decom-
posed into school effects and peer group effects.
We correct the standard errors from model 3 for
the problem of estimated regressors (SCHL687
and PEER687 ), using the technique suggested
by Murphy and Topel (1985).10 Table 2 presents
our estimation results.
Despite the dramatic differences between
northern and southern Dallas, Table 2 reveals
striking similarities in the consumer’s willingness
to pay for housing characteristics. In both parts
of the city, homebuyers pay a substantial pre-
mium for additional living space. Southern Dal-
las buyers tend to be slightly more sensitive to
the age of the property, but homebuyers in both
parts of the city have strong preferences for
newer homes. Fireplaces add value to older
homes, but the effect dissipates for newer
homes.11 After controlling for the age and size of
Table 2
Estimates of the Hedonic Price Function
Northern Dallas Southern Dallas
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
INTERCEPT 3.465** 3.123** 3.174** 3.163** 2.865** 2.867**
(.334) (.380) (.391) (.341) (.592) (.596)
SQFTLA 5.0E–4** 5.0E–4** 5.0E–4** 5.5E–4** 5.4E–4** 5.4E–4**
(2.5E–5) (2.5E–5) (2.5E–5) (5.7E–5) (5.8E–5) (5.9E–5)
YRBUILT .007* .006* .007* .008** .008** .008**
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002)
YR•POOL –.004 –.005 –.005 –.022** –.023** –.023**
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.011) (.011) (.011)
YR•FIREPL –.007* –.007* –.007* –.005 –.005 –.005
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003)
POOL .272 .289 .301 1.211** 1.255** 1.258**
(.202) (.201) (.202) (.571) (.577) (.581)
FIREPL .448** .433** .441** .431** .419** .420**
(.205) (.203) (.204) (.204) (.205) (.206)
DISTANCE –.122** –.146** –.146** –.137** –.139** –.138**
(.039) (.041) (.041) (.034) (.034) (.036)
APARTMENTS .018 .007 .006 .074 .089 .088
(.092) (.092) (.092) (.121) (.123) (.124)
PRIVSCHL .450** .431** .435** 1.073** 1.078** 1.075**
(.142) (.141) (.141) (.515) (.516) (.520)
NEIGHBORS –.055** –.042* –.039* –.042 –.041 –.041
(.023) (.024) (.024) (.029) (.029) (.030)
SPEND 3.3E–5 –7.8E–6 1.7E–5 –8.6E–6 –4.1E–6 –2.4E–6
(7.0E–5) (7.3E–5) (8.3E–5) (1.2E–4) (1.2E–4) (1.3E–4)
MATH687 — .007* — — .004 —
— (.004) — — (.007) —
SCHL687 — — .009* — — .005
— — (.005) — — (.009)
PEER687 — — .004 — — .004
— — (.007) — — (.009)
Number of
observations 150 138
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts denote a coefficient that is significant at the 5-percent (**) or
10-percent (*) level.6
the property and the presence of a fireplace,
pools have a negligible effect on home prices.12
Northern and southern Dallas homebuyers
are also similar in their willingness to pay for
most nonschool locational characteristics. In
both parts of the city, homebuyers are unwilling
to pay for a change in the concentration of
apartments (APARTMENTS) but are willing to
pay for a shorter commute (DISTANCE) and
greater access to private schools (PRIVSCHL).
Furthermore, northern and southern Dallas home-
buyers pay similar premiums for a shorter
commute or greater access. Evaluated at the
mean, a 1-percent decrease in the distance to
the city center increases home prices by 0.36
percent in northern Dallas and 0.29 percent
in southern Dallas, while a 1-percent increase
in  PRIVSCHL increases home prices by 0.17
percent in northern Dallas and 0.11 percent
in southern Dallas.13 Northern and southern
Dallas homebuyers differ substantially in their
willingness to pay for neighborhood demo-
graphics, however. Northern Dallas buyers
seem willing to pay a premium for a change in
resident characteristics, while southern Dallas
buyers do not.
Another significant difference between
northern and southern Dallas homebuyers ap-
pears in their willingness to pay for school qual-
ity. The data suggest that neither group considers
school spending an indicator of school quality
for which they are willing to pay. SPEND is
insignificant across all of the model specifica-
tions for both northern and southern Dallas.
However, the data indicate substantial differ-
ences in the willingness to pay for student
achievement on standardized tests. As model 2
illustrates, homebuyers in northern Dallas pay a
premium to live in the attendance zone of a
school where students score well on standard-
ized tests. Homebuyers in southern Dallas pay
no such premium.
Given the desegregation efforts during
the sample period, it is not particularly surpris-
ing that southern Dallas homebuyers were un-
willing to pay a premium for the neighborhood
schools.14 Busing students away from the neigh-
borhood school was much more common in
southern Dallas than in northern Dallas (Linden
1995). Therefore, while homebuyers might have
been able to rely on the attendance zone map in
northern Dallas, they had less reason to expect
that their choice of residence would guarantee a
specific school in southern Dallas. Given the
uncertainty about the stability of school atten-
dance zones, it is more surprising that northern
Dallas homebuyers were willing to pay a pre-
mium for school quality than that southern
Dallas homebuyers were unwilling to pay such
a premium.
One might suspect that northern Dallas
homebuyers are willing to pay for school zones
with good test scores because those scores indi-
cate characteristics of the students who live in
the area. If so, then the premium for test perfor-
mance would arise from the attractiveness of the
neighbors rather than the neighborhood school.
However, as model 3 illustrates, the test score
premium in northern Dallas arises from the mar-
ginal effects of the schools (SCHL687 ), not the
characteristics of the student body (PEER687).15
Evaluated at the mean, a 1-percent increase in
SCHL687 increases home prices by 0.26 percent.
Of the characteristics that we are able to ob-
serve, only the size and age of the property and
the distance from downtown have more influ-
ence than school effects on home prices in
northern Dallas.
Conclusions
Using a hedonic model of property values,
we examine the extent to which school quality
is a locational characteristic that influences
property values. We find that some home-
buyers are not only cognizant of differences in
school quality but also have revealed their
preferences for higher quality schools by pay-
ing a premium for their home. Our analysis
suggests that this premium for school quality
can be among the most important determinants
of housing prices.
Not all school characteristics appear to be
indicators of school quality, however. We find
no evidence that homebuyers are willing to pay
for changes in school expenditures or student
body characteristics. Instead, we find evidence
that the school characteristic for which home-
buyers pay a premium is the same characteristic
that economists associate with school quality,
namely, the marginal effect of the school on
student performance.
A number of policy implications can be
drawn from this research. The analysis suggests
that policies that impact school effects can have
a significant influence on residential property
values. It also casts considerable doubt on policy
analyses or policy initiatives that equate school
spending with school quality. Finally, the analy-
sis suggests that, at least as far as Dallas home-
buyers are concerned, researchers are on target
in trying to identify policy reforms that would
increase the marginal effectiveness of schools.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       7       ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1996
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remaining errors are our own.
1 A few researchers, including Sonstelie and Portney
(1980), have examined the relationship between
property values and changes in test scores, but test
score changes are generally considered a poor proxy
for the marginal effects of schools.
2 This discussion ignores the differential tax treatment of
renters and owners.
3 If assessment errors are randomly distributed, then all
residences in a given government jurisdiction are
taxed at the same expected rate. Restricting analysis
to a single taxing jurisdiction eliminates the need to
measure the potential capitalization of tax rate differen-
tials and one can focus on estimating the hedonic
price function for housing characteristics (Z ).
4 For a further discussion of the hedonic price function,
see Bartik and Smith (1987).
5 An arm’s-length sales price can be considered an
equilibrium house price for that time and location.
6 NEIGHBORS is a principal components index of resi-
dent characteristics. The demographic characteristics
included in the index are median income of the census
tract and the shares of the population that are black,
Hispanic, over 65 years of age, under 12 years of age,
employed in a blue-collar occupation, and college
educated. The principal components index explains
65 percent of the variation in these variables. The
index is negatively correlated with median income
and the population shares of elderly and college
educated individuals and positively correlated with
the remaining demographic characteristics.
7 Residences north of a line along the southern border
of Highland Park Independent School District were
classified as being in northern Dallas. The remaining
residences were classified as being in southern Dallas.
8 The means are significantly different at the 5-percent
level for all of the characteristics.
9 The weight for northern Dallas is the reciprocal of the
product of the square root of (SQFTLA) and the square
root of (1 – PRIVSCHL); the weight for southern Dallas
is the reciprocal of the product of the square root of
(1/YRBUILT) and the square root of (1 – PRIVSCHL).
Given these weights, the residuals are normally dis-
tributed and a Breusch–Pagan test can no longer
detect heteroskedasticity at the 5-percent level of
significance in either sample.
10 The Murphy–Topel error correction involves using the
variance–covariance matrix of the first-stage estimation
to inflate the standard errors that are used in hypothe-
sis testing in the second stage. Parameter estimates
are unaffected by the correction. Specifically, one tests










where Z is the matrix of second-stage regressors, F*
is a matrix of first-stage derivatives that is weighted by
the estimated coefficients on the generated regressors




) is the variance–
covariance matrix from the first-stage regression.
Murphy and Topel demonstrate that the second term in
the above equation is a positive definite matrix.
11 It is unlikely that fireplaces, in and of themselves, have
such large effects on property values. Rather, fire-
places likely proxy for other desirable home character-
istics that we cannot observe in the data.
12 Pools appear to add value in southern Dallas, but the
effect may be spurious because only five southern
Dallas homes in our sample have pools.
13 These estimates come from model 3.
14 Of course, there are other possible explanations for not
finding a relationship between school quality measures
and property values in southern Dallas.
15 Omitting the potentially collinear NEIGHBORS from the
estimation does not alter this result.8
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We decompose average test scores into
school effects and peer group effects, following the
methodology outlined in Hanushek and Taylor
(1990). Thus, we hypothesize that student achieve-
ment in period T is a function of the student’s
complete history of school (S) and student and
family (F ) characteristics. However, because the
relationship is recursive, we can write
where AiT is the achievement of student i in period
T, the SikT are dummy variables that equal one if
the ith student attends school k in period T and
equal zero otherwise, and FiT represents student
and family characteristics in period T. In this
formulation, qkT represents the value added by
school k in period T and
represents the level of student achievement
that could be expected regardless of the school
attended. Thus, qkT is a measure of school effects,
and  the  average A
^
iT for each school is a meas-
ure of peer group effects in that school.
Whenever student-level data are unavail-
able and the marginal effects of schools are inde-
pendent of the student and family characteristics,
equation A.1 can be estimated at the school level as
In this equation, AkT is average student achieve-
ment at school k in period T, FkT represents
average student and family characteristics at
school k in period T, γ + µkT = qkT + εkT, and εkT
represents the average estimation error for stu-
dents at school k in period T. At this level of
aggregation, γ + µkT is the best available proxy





best available proxy for peer group effects. Be-
cause analysis at the school level incorporates
error into the estimates of school and peer group
effects, it is particularly important to treat these
Appendix
variables as estimated regressors in any subse-
quent analysis.
DISD provided data on student body charac-
teristics and student achievement scores for ninety-
six primary schools in its jurisdiction for the years
1986 and 1987. The student body characteristics
used in the analysis are the percentage of students
who were black or Hispanic (B&HISP ) and the
percentage of students who were not receiving free
or reduced-price lunches (the best available proxy
for socioeconomic status, SES). The student
achievement data used in the analysis are average
scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills in mathe-
matics. We use sixth-grade scores from 1987
(MATH687 ) and fifth-grade scores from 1986
(MATH586) as the measures of student achieve-
ment. The variable XCOHORT (the percentage
increase in the number of students taking the
exam) controls for changes in cohort size between
1986 and 1987.
From these data and the estimated coeffi-
cients in Table A.1, we construct measures of
school and peer group effects for each of the
ninety-six schools in our study. Thus, for each
school, SCHL687k = 26.767 + µkT, and PEER687k
= 0.740•MATH586k – 0.083•XCOHORTk –
0.004•B&HISPk + 0.004•SESk.
Table A.1
Estimating School and Peer Group









Number of observations 96
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